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THE UNMASKING OPTION
JAMES GRIMMELMANN†
I’d like to tell a story about online harassment and extract a surprising proposal from it. I’m going to argue that we should consider selectively unmasking anonymous online speakers, not as an aid to litigation,
but as a substitute for it. Identifying harassers can be an effective way of
holding them accountable, while causing less of a chilling effect on socially valuable speech than liability would.
In the end, I’ll conclude that this proposal is unworkable due to the
danger of pretextual uses of an unmasking remedy by plaintiffs looking
to engage in extra-legal retaliation. Even this conclusion, though, has
something valuable to teach us about the uses and abuses of online anonymity. Decoupling anonymity from liability enables us to understand
more clearly what’s at stake with each.
I. SKANKS IN NYC
To set the stage, let’s talk about Skanks in NYC.1 That’s the name
of an anonymous blog someone created on Google’s Blogspot service.
Actually, calling it a “blog” may be something of an overstatement. It
consisted of five entries, all posted the same day, in which the anonymous author called a model named Liskula Cohen, a “psychotic, lying,
whoring . . . skank,” “Skankiest in NYC,” a “ho” and so on.
Cohen filed for a “pre-action disclosure” order against Google to
disclose the anonymous blogger’s name so she could sue for defamation.
The blogger objected, saying the posts were just hyperbole and “trash
talk,” not anything actionable. The judge, however, agreed with Cohen,
looking to the American Heritage Dictionary definition of “skank” to
conclude that calling someone “disgustingly foul or filthy and often considered sexually promiscuous” is defamatory. Thus, since Cohen had a
“meritorious cause of action,” the judge ordered Google to disclose the
blogger’s identity.2
In an O’Henry-esque plot twist, the anonymous blogger turned out
to be one Rosemary Port—if not quite a friend of Cohen’s, then certainly
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1. Wendy Davis, Judge Rules That Model Has the Right to Learn ‘Skank’ Blogger’s Identity,
MEDIAPOST, Aug. 17, 2009 http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_
aid=111783.
2. Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424, 428-30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009), available at
http://m.mediapost.com/pdf/Cohen_doc.pdf.
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a frenemy. According to an (anonymous) source who spoke to the New
York Post,3 the source of Port’s anger was that Cohen had criticized the
company Port kept to Port’s boyfriend. After learning who her antagonist
was, Cohen filed a $3 million defamation suit, but quickly dropped it,
saying, “It adds nothing to my life to hurt hers. I wish her happiness.”
A. Right and Wrong
Port’s conduct may have been unfortunate, but what should we
make of Cohen’s? Although they vary in the threshold they require the
plaintiff to meet, courts across the country agree that a “John Doe subpoena” of this sort should issue only where the plaintiff appears to have a
winnable lawsuit against the (as-yet unknown) defendant. Cohen represented to the court that she had an urgent legal need for Port’s identity—
to file her defamation lawsuit—and that was the basis for the court’s
ruling. But almost as soon Cohen had Port’s name in hand, the lawsuit
went by the wayside. So much for urgent legal need. Was this a hypocritical abuse of the legal system?
Dan Solove thought so. He’s written, “The law must restrict badfaith lawsuits designed solely to unmask anonymous speakers.”4 He saw
Cohen’s suit in precisely those terms, saying it appeared “she was using
the lawsuit only to unmask the blogger.”5 For him, the Skanks in NYC
case is an abuse of the justice system.
I think Solove has things exactly backwards. Cohen v. Google
wasn’t an abuse of the justice system, it was justice. Rosemary Port got
exactly what she deserved. She tried to shame Cohen; the result was that
she herself was shamed. That seems about right. There’s something
beautifully Kantian about it. Lawrence Becker would say that it was a
“fitting” and “proportionate” “return.”6
It strikes me as a good thing that Cohen dropped her lawsuit. For
one thing, lawsuits are shockingly expensive. Cohen resolved her beef
against Port for a small fraction of what litigation through final judgment
would have cost. If the only response to online harassment is willingness
to litigate, then only the rich will have any protection against it at all. For
another, what more would Cohen have achieved by carrying her lawsuit
through to the bitter end? Port was apparently close to judgment-proof,
which is another way of saying that a verdict for Cohen would have
3. Lachlan Cartwright et al., Secret Grudge of NY ‘Skankies’, N.Y. POST, August 21, 2009,
at 9, available at http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/secret_grudge_of_ny_skankies_f6c4ttnK4
zchSR51tDJoYJ.
4. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 149 (2007), available at
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dsolove/Future-of-Reputation/text/futureofreputation-ch6.pdf.
5. Posting of Daniel J. Solove to CONCURRING OPINIONS,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/08/can-you-be-sued-for-unmasking-ananonymous-blogger.html (Aug. 25, 2009, 7:04 EDT).
6. LAWRENCE C. BECKER, RECIPROCITY (1990).
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bankrupted Port without actually achieving anything for Cohen. And for
yet another, it’s not self-evident that Cohen would have won a defamation suit. I’m more confident that calling someone a “ho” and a “whoring
skank” online is morally wrong than I am that it’s legally actionable. In
many cases, the convoluted doctrines of defamation and privacy law will
deny recovery for reasons that have little to do with the blameworthiness
of the defendant’s conduct.
Perhaps this lawsuit was pretextual. But if so, then bring on the pretextual lawsuits! It’s better to have pretextual lawsuits that are resolved
quickly and lead to appropriate embarrassment than protracted lawsuits
that cause serious additional harm to the defendant. And once we put it
this way, why not cut out the middleman? If there’s nothing wrong with
a pretextual lawsuit brought to unmask the defendant, we might as well
drop the fiction of the lawsuit as the basis for unmasking. I’m proposing,
in other words, that the legal system prefer unmasking to the standard
remedies at law. Without dwelling on the details, what if we had a system that routinely unmasked defendants, one that channeled plaintiffs
into unmasking and away from damage suits?
II. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
Thus, here’s a proposal for a kind of minimally invasive surgery to
deal with online harassment. Suppose that we were to give the victims of
online harassment an expedited procedure to unmask their harassers.
Specifically, following a quick judicial proceeding with an easier required showing, a relevant intermediary would be required to turn over
whatever it knew about the harasser (typically an IP address or subscriber information). In return, the plaintiff would be required to give up
all remedies at law. These two rules, taken together, would channel many
cases into unmasking rather than into litigation.
My intent is not to endorse complete reciprocal transparency in all
things, along the lines of David Brin’s The Transparent Society.7 That’s a
recipe for madness; privacy is a basic element of the human condition.
Most people who choose to go online without identifying themselves
have a good reason for it, and we should ordinarily respect that decision.
I’m also not suggesting any new data-retention requirements. At least for
now, the Internet’s ad hoc balance—it’s easy to keep your identity superficially private and hard to keep it truly private—is about right. The harassers we really think we can reach—the AutoAdmit posters, the lulzmobs, the Rosemary Ports—aren’t using advanced techniques to hide
their identities.
There are many things to like about unmasking. In the first place,
it’s particularly effective at dealing with harassment. Many of the worst
7.

DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY (1998).
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cases involve online mobs: crowds of mutually anonymous people who
spur each other on to increasingly nasty behavior. One of the best ways
to bust up a mob is to call out its members by name, like Atticus Finch in
front of the jailhouse. It rehumanizes them, activating feelings of empathy and shame, removing the dangerous psychological condition in
which they fear no reprisal. In this respect, visible acts of unmasking—
which make members of the crowd more aware that their actions have
consequences—may be a more effective deterrent than actually punishing them.
Unmasking also has some major advantages over other possible responses to anonymous online harassment. The First Amendment puts
significant limits on the use of tort law. This leads to cases in which
harmful, wrongful speech can’t be redressed through a suit for damages.
In response, we’ve seen equally dangerous calls to pare back the First
Amendment’s protections. Unmasking sidesteps that dilemma. Not all
the speech that we’d like to protect under the First Amendment needs to
be protected as anonymous speech.
Similarly, unmasking is a better option in many cases than holding
intermediaries liable. The typical poster to a web site is more morally
responsible, and better able to control her own speech, than the web site
operator, its hosting provider, or the ISP. Making any of these intermediaries liable is likely to lead to substantial chilling effects, as they take
down any potentially problematic material at the drop of a hat. Our experience with the DMCA in this regard hasn’t been particularly cheerful. In
contrast, requiring these intermediaries only to turn over what information they have on the identity of the poster is a smaller burden, and one
that doesn’t give them bad incentives to take down too much material.
On balance, an identification requirement is likely to be more
speech-friendly than most of the alternatives on the table. It avoids the
excessively censorious effects of direct and intermediary liability—but it
also helps protect the speech interests of the victims of anonymous online
harassment, who in many cases today are forced off the web in fear.
A. Shame, Good and Bad
Let us be clear. An argument for regular unmasking is, in effect, an
argument for vigilantism. One of the reasons unmasking works is that it
exposes anonymous harassers to mass shaming. Solove has argued 8 that
online shaming can be “the scarlet letter in digital form,” a point he illustrates with the story of Dog Poop Girl, who was vilified by millions on
the Internet after failing to clean up after her dog on the subway.
From that perspective, to unmask posters is to open up Pandora’s
Box. Rosemary Port could become the next Dog Poop Girl, her face plas8.

SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 1–11.
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tered everywhere online, as millions of people mock her, exposing her to
shame and retaliation that far exceeds anything she deserved. Aren’t we
unleashing exactly the same forces of hate and innuendo that we’re supposed to be tamping down, leading to a never-ending shame spiral?
Compared with legal process and societal oversight, isn’t this illiberalism, pure and simple?
Perhaps. But if so, it’s a surprisingly tolerable kind of illiberalism.
The legal system does violence, too; it uses the full power of society and
the state against its victims in a very real and direct way. Dog Poop Girllevel abuse will be rare, but damage lawsuits in run-of-the-mill harassment cases will routinely all but wipe out defendants. If the alternative is
being sued into bankruptcy, online shaming isn’t the worst option out
there.
Perhaps even more tellingly, look who started the hate. As between
the innocent plaintiff and the defendant who originally posted mean
things about her, it seems clear which of these two ought to bear the risk
of a disproportionate response. There’s still a plausible fit between the
harm the shamer caused and the consequences she must endure. And if
massive online shame for the shamer is a potential outcome, this seems
like a singularly appropriate form of deterrence, one that might actually
be psychologically effective with would-be harassers.
B. Retaliation
And now for my own O’Henry-esque twist. I’ve just argued that an
unmasking option is superior on most theoretical dimensions to traditional lawsuits. But I don’t see a way of making it work in practice.
Sometimes a lawsuit, with a good old-fashioned damage remedy,
really is the best outcome. If harassment leads you to lose your job, that’s
a real, economic harm, and compensatory damages make sense. Forcing
a plaintiff to give up any hope of that remedy is making matters worse.
In theory, we could design the unmasking option so that the plaintiff
gets to choose between unmasking (with a lowered threshold) or a lawsuit (with the usual John Doe subpoena standard). But that’s an awful
choice to put the plaintiff to, because of Arrow’s Information Paradox.
Until she finds out who her harasser is, she’s not in a good position to
choose: she can’t tell whether the harasser is embarrassment-proof or
judgment-proof. What if she chooses the identification, only to learn that
her nemesis is a rich recluse who enjoys victimizing women and doesn’t
care about his own reputation?
If the unmasking option is unfair to plaintiffs, it’s also unfair to defendants. You can bet that a corporate CEO would love to characterize
some salty criticism of his leadership as “harassment,” trace it back to an
employee, and take a little revenge. Here, even if we require the plaintiff
to give up legal remedies, identification itself imposes serious harms. A
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company that can retaliate in ways other than filing a lawsuit would be
delighted with the unmasking option’s lowered threshold.
Thus, it turns out that the trade at the core of the unmasking option—get an identity in exchange for giving up the right to sue—is
poorly matched. Sometimes plaintiffs get far too little; sometimes they
get far too much.
C. Pretext
This conclusion, however, tells us something important about online
privacy. Many anonymous posters justifiably fear the pretextual plaintiff. As soon as we lower the standard to unmask people online, we open
the door to all sorts of disquieting uses. Companies want to unmask
whistleblowers, and perhaps some stalkers might find a way to use it to
learn more about their victims.
This is a classic problem of privacy as a second-best solution. I said
earlier that people have legitimate reasons to go online anonymously.
Our belief that those reasons are legitimate stems from the idea that it
would be wrong for these people to have to suffer being fired, being
stalked, being personally embarrassed, and so on. But in many cases,
these wrongs are harms the law has principled reasons not to redress directly, or simply has practical difficulties in dealing with. Free speech
rights, freedom of contract, and the difficulties of proving causation will
mean that many people who suffer retaliation will have no legal redress
for it. Anonymity is the best we can practically do, and so, unless we’re
prepared to make much bigger changes to the legal landscape, we’ll have
to protect people from pretextual unmasking.
But if the fear of pretext is legitimate, the strength of the plaintiff’s
cause of action isn’t always a very good proxy for it. Some plaintiffs will
have a valid lawsuit, but bring it for totally pretextual reasons—a few
stray comments about a mid-level corporate executive could blow a
whistleblower’s anonymity. Contrariwise as I’ve been arguing, there are
plenty of people who ought to be unmasked, but who haven’t done anything actionably tortious, given the labyrinthine folds of defamation and
privacy law. Pretextual lawsuits need not be baseless, and vice versa.
CONCLUSIONS
Thus, I take two lessons from this thought experiment. The first is
that we need to decouple unmasking and litigation. The precise inversion
I proposed—give up your lawsuit to make unmasking easier—doesn’t
work. But we should be more creatively exploring unmasking standards
that aren’t directly tied to the strength of the plaintiff’s case in chief. We
should consider the pros and cons of unmasking directly, on their own
merits, without always referring back to the lawsuit.
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So, on the one hand, in order to better protect the victims’ interests
in these lawsuits, we should find ways of dropping elements from a typical John Doe subpoena. Thus, for example, a plaintiff typically needs to
show necessity: that she’s exhausted other options to learn the harasser’s
identity. Chuck that one out the window; if the plaintiff thinks that asking the intermediary for the identifying information is the best way to
learn who the harasser is, that ought to be good enough for us.
On the other hand, to protect defendants, we should be more explicit
about pretextual unmasking. Right now, we’re protecting defendants by
testing the strength of the plaintiff’s case. We should acknowledge explicitly that the true threat is retaliation, and develop doctrines that directly ask whether the defendant legitimately fears retaliation from being
unmasked. Those doctrines could then usefully be applied in any case
where unmasking is at stake, regardless of the area of law in which it
arises.
This is a Legal Realist argument. It’s concerned with the social
goals the law is trying to achieve—and with what the law on the ground
is actually doing, regardless of what the law says it’s doing. A John Doe
subpoena standard that sees only the strength of the plaintiff’s case is
ultimately both unjust and unstable, because it’s asking the wrong question. Unmasking is the very best kind of wrong answer: it helps us understand the question we meant to ask.

